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Abstract—Body sensor networks (BSNs) for healthcare have
more stringent security and context adaptation requirements
than required in large-scale sensor networks for environment
monitoring. Policy-based management enables flexible adaptive
behavior by supporting dynamic loading, enabling and disabling
of policies without shutting down nodes. This overcomes many
of the limitations of sensor operating systems, such as TinyOS,
which do not support dynamic modification of code. Alterna-
tive schemes for adaptation, such as network programming,
have a high communication cost and suffer from operational
interruption. In addition, a policy-driven approach enables fine-
grained access control through specifying authorization policies.
This paper presents the design, implementation and evaluation
of an efficient policy system called Finger which enables policy
interpretation and enforcement on distributed sensors to support
sensor level adaptation and fine-grained access control. It features
support for dynamic management of policies, minimization of
resources usage, high responsiveness and node autonomy. The
policy system is integrated as a TinyOS component, exposing
simple, well-defined interfaces which can easily be used by
application developers. The system performance in terms of
processing latency and resource usage is evaluated.
Index Terms—Policy-driven management, policy system, body
sensor networks, adaptation, authorization, access control.
I. INTRODUCTION
BODY sensor networks (BSNs) [6], [34], [36] have re-cently been employed for various personal applications,
in particularly in the healthcare domain [30]. In a BSN,
biomedical sensors are attached to, or possibly implanted
in, patients to continuously monitor physiological parameters
for health management. Abnormal events indicating coronary
problems such as high heart rate or blood pressure can be
detected and reported to a doctor for immediate medical
actions. Such BSNs are particularly suitable for post-operative
care in hospitals and for treatment of chronically ill or elder
patients at home.
There is typically little functional redundancy between the
nodes in a BSN compared to a large-scale sensor network,
e.g., for environment monitoring where most nodes perform
Manuscript received September 2, 2008; revised August 7, 2009. The
associate editor coordinating the review of this paper and approving it for
publication was R. Katz.
Y. Zhu is with the Department of Computer Science and Engineering,
Shanghai Jiao Tong University (e-mail: yzhu@cs.sjtu.edu.cn).
S. L. Keoh is with the Department of Information and System Security
(ISS), Philips Research Lab (e-mail: sye.loong.keoh@philips.com).
M. Sloman and E. C. Lupu are with the Department of Computing, Imperial
College London, 180 Queens Gate, London SW7 2RH, United Kingdom (e-
mail: {m.sloman, e.c.lupu}@imperial.ac.uk).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TNSM.2009.03.090301.
Fig. 1. The policy service architecture for body sensor networks. Each sensor
maintains its own policies and implements both PDP and PEP.
similar functions and have the same sensors. BSNs exhibit
several unique requirements when compared with traditional
sensor networks. First, sensors in a healthcare BSN often need
to adapt their behaviours to changes in the patient’s medical
condition or activity. The sensors should be configured accord-
ingly to reflect such changes. For example, when a patient
is suspected to have a cold, the temperature sensors should
become more sensitive and report more temperature data for
better monitoring. In some situations, the doctor may want
more detail on blood sugar level of the patient, so glucose
sensors which have been turned off for power conservation
must be enabled.
Second, security is essential for practical use of BSNs
in healthcare where privacy concerns about access to a pa-
tient’s health condition data can be important. Preventing
unauthorised access to actuators, such as insulin or other drug
pumps, may be even more critical as this involves the patient’s
safety. However, there is a need for different types of medical
staff to have differentiated privileges for access to a patient’s
sensors and actuators. There is also the need to protect against
malicious attackers, particularly for celebrities and other high
profile patients. Thus, only authorized access to body sensors
should be permitted, for both accessing data and performing
actions, while unauthorized access must be blocked.
Little existing work fulfils the above requirements. TinyOS
[4], the de facto standard operating system for sensors, does
not support dynamic modification of code once the program
is deployed. Thus, it is difficult for a sensor to adapt its
behaviour – a typical solution is to shut down the network and
reprogram the sensors. Most network programming protocols
[18], [23], [25] require the whole program code image to be
disseminated to the sensors through wireless communications.
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This not only incurs large wireless communication overhead,
which is the main source of power consumption on sensors,
but also interrupts the operation of the network. For data
confidentiality, symmetric cryptography has been used in
sensor networks. Key management schemes [15], [17], [27]
ensure that sensors trying to communicate with each other
share common keys. However, such approaches achieve only
in-transit data confidentiality but do not perform access control
on individual nodes.
Policy-driven management has been widely recognized as
an important technology for managing distributed systems
[35]. By separating policies from the system implementation,
a policy-driven system can adapt to changes by dynamically
changing policies. In addition, fine-grained access control
can be realized by making use of authorization policies.
We have developed a policy-based system [22], [30] for
pervasive healthcare, which uses a PDA as a coordinator
that provides functions, such as discovery of sensors, event
routing and external remote communication. It uses a policy
system called Ponder2 [3] which runs on a relatively powerful
PDA hosting a java virtual machine environment. Sensors are
treated as passive, managed objects, polled at regular intervals
for readings.
Sensor nodes are becoming increasingly powerful [33] and
can implement a policy system to support intelligent sensing
services. For example, sensors can generate events indicating
thresholds have been exceeded. Moreover, they can adapt
their behaviors in response to context changes or changes in
application requirements. For example, a sensor may adapt
to the current activity of the user. Direct interaction between
sensors becomes possible and at the same time, access to
sensor resources is regulated by authorization policies.
Various programming paradigms have been explored to
cater for the severe resource constraints and potentially large-
scale of distributed sensor networks. Declarative languages
[7], [12] provide high-level programming models, which can
capture application semantics in a more natural way. This
reduces development time compared to programming using
languages such as nesC. Although such declarative languages
are suitable in application scenarios like data acquisition,
they are not applicable for adaptation or reconfiguration.
Both declarative languages and low-level programming lan-
guages provide no support for adaptation to future unknown
changes. However, policy-driven approaches provide a flexible
approach to reconfiguration and adaptive behavior.
This paper presents the design, implementation and evalua-
tion of Finger, an efficient policy system running on sensors.
This system supports interpretation and enforcement of both
obligation policies, which are event-condition-action rules that
perform an action in response to an event, and authorization
policies, which define what resources or services a subject can
access on a target sensor. As illustrated in Fig. 1, each sensor
manages its own policies and implements both a Policy De-
cision Point (PDP) and a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). A
PDP interprets policies and makes policy decisions. Following
the decision made by the PDP, the PEP enforces the policy,
i.e., it invokes the action specified by the obligation policy, or
permits/denies a subject from performing a requested action.
In essence, Finger supports a considerably simplified version
Fig. 2. A body sensor node consisting of a processing board and a pluggable
sensing board, compared to the size of a ballpoint pen.
of the Ponder2 language for policy specification [3]. The
effective simplification makes the policy language suitable for
processing on resource-constrained sensors. Compact design
and implementation on TinyOS makes Finger efficient and
responsive while introducing modest resource consumption
overheads. Note that the preliminary work of this research has
been reported in [37]–[38]. This paper provides more complete
design and analysis of the policy system.
The paper is structured as follows – Section II describes
the system background, gives a motivating example, and
highlights the attack model and design objectives. In Section
III we look at the architectural design, followed by imple-
mentation details in Section IV. We then present performance
evaluation results in Section V. Finally, Section VI discusses
some limitations of the current implementation. We review
related work in Section VII, and conclude the paper and
discuss future research directions in Section VIII.
II. BACKGROUND AND DESIGN OBJECTIVES
This section gives a brief overview of the system back-
ground and a motivating example that shows the need to
exploit policy-based management for BSNs. We discuss the
attack model considered in the design of Finger and summa-
rize design considerations.
A. Body Sensor Networks
A BSN consists of a controller, body sensors, and possibly
dynamic nodes. The controller manages the whole network and
can be a PDA or Smartphone, which is relatively powerful,
compared to sensors. Body sensors are attached on the body or
implanted within the body for monitoring various healthcare
parameters. A body sensor is subject to severe resource
constraints as it has small memory and limited processing
capability. Dynamic nodes represent medics, such as nurses
and doctors, which may intermittently interact with a patient
BSN for short periods to obtain readings or change settings.
Finger is intended for the hardware platform of body sensor
node [1], equipped with a TI MSP430F149 microcontroller –
see Fig. 2. This microcontroller has a 16-bit RISC proces-
sor and works at 16MHz. It has 60KB, read-only program
memory for executable code and 2KB writable data memory
which serves as a data stack. A CR2430 button Li-battery is
used to power a node. The sensing board integrates sensors
such as temperature sensor and accelerometer, which can be
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connected to the processing board. A Chipcon CC2420 radio
transceiver supports communication with other nodes using
the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol [2] at 2.4G Hz. The maximum
communication bandwidth is 250 kbps.
TinyOS is an operating system designed for resource-
constrained sensors. A TinyOS application program is a graph
of software components with well defined bi-directional inter-
faces. Its event-driven execution model is effective for energy-
efficient design. The processor switches to the idle mode when
there is no task to perform, which consumes significantly less
power compared to the active mode. TinyOS is a very simple
operating system and is thus suitable for memory-constrained
sensors. Complex OS functionalities such as dynamic memory
allocation are not supported.
B. Motivating Example
Consider a simple healthcare scenario where a BSN, at-
tached to a user for on-body monitoring, includes a controller,
a temperature sensor and an accelerometer sensor which can
be used to determine user activity, e.g., walking or sitting.
The controller typically performs important tasks such as data
aggregation, policy deployment and security management.
To detect the activity of the user, an accelerometer sensor
starts a timer and regularly (e.g., every 5 seconds) reads
accelerometer data. The timer frequency is an important
parameter that determines the ability to detect activity changes.
A higher frequency allows the sensor to detect more rapid
movement changes but then the sensor consumes more energy.
It is intuitive that when the acceleration is over a certain
threshold, it is likely that the user is starting to walk. Thus, a
sensor should increase its measurement frequency so that more
acceleration data can be obtained for more accurate estimation.
When the acceleration becomes smaller than the threshold,
it is probable that the user is sitting or standing. Thus, the
measurement rate can be reduced for energy conservation. Two
obligation policies can realize such adaptation.
oblig on accel_event (acceleration)
(1) do adjust_measurement_interval (1s)
if acceleration >=30
oblig on accel_event (acceleration)
(2) do adjust_measurement_interval (5s)
if acceleration <=20
The measurement interval can thus be re-configured according
to application requirements by updating the two policies.
A doctor may decide that it is useful to study the re-
lation between body temperature and user activity, so the
temperature sensor should record the body temperature when
activity changes occur. However, this function has not been
pre-programmed on the sensor. But, this could be achieved
by deploying new policies. The accelerometer sensor should
notify the temperature sensor of new activities. Thus, it needs
an obligation policy for this.
oblig on new_activity_event (activity)
(3) do send_event (new_activity_event,
temperature_sensor)
The temperature sensor accordingly needs an obligation policy
to record the current body temperature when a new activity
occurs.
oblig on new_activity_event (activity)
(4) do record_temperature
The accelerometer sensor raises an event on the temperature
sensor and this should be subject to authorization control.
Otherwise, unauthorized nodes may send arbitrary events and
do harm to the node. Thus, the temperature sensor needs an





The controller often needs to re-configure the sensor network
by changing policies on sensors. Policy management tasks
include loading, unloading, enabling and disabling policies.
Thus, the accelerometer sensor should have an authorization









This example demonstrates that sensors must frequently adapt
to both context changes and application requirements. They
also need to cooperate with each other to achieve application
goals. Obligation and authorization policies provide a flexible
and easily modified means of specifying what interactions
must be performed and what interactions are permitted.
Note that the subject and the target in an authorization
policy can be a role in a domain hierarchy rather than a hard
coded node ID [3]. This allows policies to be defined for
groups of nodes rather than just individual ones so policies do
not have to be modified when sensors are added or removed
from the group.
C. Attack Model
Body sensor networks make use of short range wireless
communication and are vulnerable to various attacks. The
paper considers the following attacks.
Eavesdropping. Wireless transmissions are susceptible to
passive eavesdropping. Sensitive data may be therefore ac-
cessed by unauthorized users, which compromises data confi-
dentiality. Therefore, data to be transmitted over the wireless
channel should be encrypted to prevent passive eavesdroppers.
Active attacks. Other than passive listening, active attackers
may alter or replay messages causing serious harm to the
patient. For example, replaying a message to a drug pump can
cause severe drug overdose. Authorization and authentication
mechanisms are needed to prevent active attacks.
Impersonation. Authentication is essential to prevent an
attacker from impersonating a legitimate user, such as a medic,
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Fig. 3. The architectural overview of Finger. Components of Finger are connected by interfaces that define commands and events. The gray end of an
interface provides commands and fire events, while the white end uses commands and handle events.
in order to modify the behavior of the BSN and hence harm
the patient.
D. Design Objectives
There are a number of challenges in implementing a policy
system on small sensors. It is crucial to make efficient use
of the limited resources such as small memory. Policy based
systems such as Ponder2, or XACML are inappropriate for
resource constrained sensors. It is impractical to pre-load all
required policies so dynamic management of policies with
each node responsible for maintaining and managing its own
policies is required, i.e., it must be possible to load, unload,
enable and disable policies but at the same time protect these
important operations from unauthorized access.
The following design objectives were considered important
in the implementation of Finger:
∙ Dynamic management of policies. When a node is
discovered and joins a network the policies appropriate to
its role within the network must be dynamically loaded
[30] and possibly modified at a later time to enable
context adaptation.
∙ Minimum memory footprint. The policy service mem-
ory requirements must be minimized.
∙ Responsiveness. Policy software should introduce mini-
mal processing latency, as some applications may require
critical response times.
∙ Well defined APIs. These are needed to enable easy
development of new policy-based applications.
∙ Energy efficiency. Policies should introduce minimal
processing overheads in order to minimize power con-
sumption.
III. DESIGN OF FINGER
This section discusses the design of Finger. The overview of
Finger is first presented and then the authentication protocol
is described.
A. Overview
The architectural overview of Finger is depicted in Fig. 3.
The core model comprises two components – the Obligation
Interpreter (OI) and the Authorization Interpreter (AI) for in-
terpreting and enforcing obligation policies and authorization
policies, respectively. Both the OI and the AI provide a reposi-
tory for storing policies but the dynamic management of stored
policies is implemented in an independent component that
provides policy management actions. This enables requests
to manage policies to also be governed by authentication and
authorization checks
The OI receives events generated from the internal TinyOS
components controlling sensors, e.g., temperature sensors,
as well as external events received as incoming messages
from the network. It can perform actions on software or
hardware components within the node. An action on a software
component could generate an event or message to be sent out
to the network. On receiving an event, the OI searches the
policy repository for all policies matching the event type. It
then checks whether the condition part of the corresponding
obligation policy evaluates to true and if so, the OI invokes
the specified action through the Action interface.
All incoming requests from external nodes must be authen-
ticated and authorized. Incoming requests could be either an
incoming event or a request to perform an action on a hardware
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or software component, including policy management opera-
tions. Incoming requests are of the form <subject, action, # of
paras, paras>. The Request Manager (RM) receives incoming
requests and authenticates the requesting subject by invoking
the Authentication Manager (AM). The design of this module
is discussed in the next subsection.
If the subject is successfully authenticated, the request is
passed to the AI via the ProcessRequest interface. The AI
then searches its authorization policies. If a policy for the
subject and the requested action is found, the associated
condition is checked and if positive, the associated action is
then invoked. For incoming, authorized events, the associated
action is treated as raising an event. The first parameter of the
request indicates the event type and the second one indicates
the event value. The AI invokes, through the RaiseExter-
nalEvents interface, the ExternalEventsM component, which
immediately triggers the OI.
As previously discussed, the code size must be minimized.
There is considerable common functionality between the OI
and the AI such as the way they both evaluate constraints.
Thus, we factor out the implementation of condition evaluation
and make it as an independent component, so this common
code can be shared by both the OI and the AI.
B. Authentication Protocol
To make access control effective, the target node must
authenticate the requesting node before making the authoriza-
tion decision. The requesting node provides its <ID, role>
in messages to a target node. The AM must decide whether
the requester really possesses the ID and whether it has the
claimed role. In Fig. 4, a simple example is illustrated. The
example BSN consists of a controller and four sensors. Sensor
3 sends a request to sensor 4 and sensor 4 wants to authenticate
sensor 3.
We have developed an efficient authentication protocol
based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement. Both public-
key and symmetric cryptography are employed. In the ini-
tialization phase, each sensor 𝑖 generates a secret 𝑠𝑖, and
computes a keyshare 𝑝𝑖 based on its secret, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑔𝑠𝑖 . It
is computationally infeasible to recover the secret, given the
keyshare. The sensor obtains the group key from the controller,
and exchanges its keyshare with the controller. The channel
by which the group key is obtained and the keyshares are
exchanged is physically secure e.g., by plugging it into the
controller’s USB port.
The controller creates and maintains a membership list of
node ID, role and keyshare. Table I shows the content of the
table for the example. Using the group key, the controller can
periodically publish the membership to all members in the
network whenever there are changes in the membership. The
controller encrypts the membership list only once for each
release and this only incurs a single broadcast transmission.
All the sensors in the network can decrypt the membership list
using the group key. However, this is based on the assumption
that nodes which have been admitted into the network do not
behave maliciously by spoofing the membership list.
With the membership list, a pair of sensors 𝑖 and 𝑗 can
then establish a pairwise shared key 𝐾𝑖𝑗 . Sensor 𝑖 computes
Fig. 4. Diffie-Hellman based key establishment, and three-way handshake
authentication procedure.
the shared key as follows,
𝐾𝑖𝑗 = (𝑝𝑗)
𝑠𝑖 = (𝑔𝑠𝑗 )𝑠𝑖 = 𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗 . (1)
Sensor 𝑗 can compute 𝐾𝑖𝑗 in a similar way. The group
key is renewed whenever a member is detected to have left
the network or been compromised, or when it has been used
for an extended period of time. When renewing the group
key, the controller sends the new group key to every member
individually. The new key is encrypted using the shared key
of the controller and each member.
With the pairwise shared key, we develop a challenge-
response exchange procedure for a sensor to authenticate a
requesting node. Consider the scenario in the example that
sensor 4 wants to authenticate sensor 3. The process is initiated
by sensor 3 sending a request to sensor 4. Sensor 4 can
compute the pairwise shared key 𝐾43 according to (1). Sensor
4 then challenges sensor 3 by sending its nonce encrypted with
the shared key 𝐾34. Sensor 3 should decrypt the encrypted
nonce and respond with a (nonce +1) encrypted with the
shared key. Sensor 4 authenticates sensor 3 if the response
content is indeed (nonce + 1).
The three-way handshake is costly since it introduces two
additional transmissions. This not only wastes power but also
introduces overall latency for request processing. We propose
a ticket technique to avoid a three-way handshake each time
a request is processed. After successful authentication, sensor
4 creates a ticket which is essentially a random number and
sends it to sensor 3. Later, each time sensor 3 requests an
action on sensor 4, it increases the ticket by one and appends
it to the request. Sensor 4 decrypts the request and checks the
ticket. If the ticket is indeed the ticket plus one, it is able to
ensure that the requesting node is sensor 3. Such a ticket is
renewed, through the target starting a new challenge-response
procedure, after it has been used for an exceeded period.
Note that the exponential notations in the DH-based proto-
col are for conceptual description only. Exponential computa-
tion with big integers is too computationally expensive to be
implemented on body sensors. Instead, we use elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC), as discussed in detail in Section IV-E.
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TABLE I
MEMBERSHIP LIST  
Node ID Role Keyshare
0 s^g rellortnoc 0
1 ra s^g 1




LANGUAGE SYNTAX SUMMARY 
policy:
    obligation_policy 
    authorization_policy 
obligation_policy : 
type # pid & eid ? condition ~ action 
authorization_policy: 
type # pid & sid @ tid ? condition ~ action
condition: 
contextId ^ comparator value
contextId ^ range_condition 
always 
comparator: one of 
>= <= == !=
range_condition: 







In this section, we discuss implementation details. We have
implemented Finger using nesC [16] with TinyOS v1.15 on
the BSN hardware platform introduced in Section II.
A. Policy Specification
We have to scale down the complexity of policies since
small sensors cannot afford to process complex policies used
in traditional distributed systems. We designed a simple and
efficient policy language with a syntax suitable for efficient
processing by body sensors yet it is expressive and able to
fulfil most management needs of sensor networks. The syntax
of policies is given in Table II.
An obligation policy specifies the event, the action and the
condition under which the action must be performed. Note that
an action is also associated with several parameters to be used
when this action is invoked. An authorization policy defines
the subject, the target, the action and the condition. A subject
or target is a role in a domain hierarchy. Details of how nodes
are discovered and assigned to roles are described in [30]. The
policies used in the motivating example can be specified as
shown in Table III. For policy (1) the first “0” indicates it is an
obligation policy and “#1” is its ID. The obligation-triggering
event “1?” refers to the acceleration event. The condition 30
refers to the acceleration context variable “1^”. The obligation
has an action of “1” to adjust measurement interval and the
action takes a parameter of 1.
B. Memory Organization
It is important to manage the sensor’s limited memory. Since
TinyOS does not support dynamic memory allocation, we need
to allocate space to hold the maximum number of policies
statically. For each type of policy, we maintain two lists: one
for the available policies and the other for vacant cells. Each
time a policy is loaded, a vacant cell is obtained from the
vacant list and inserted into the available list. Conversely,
when an existing policy is removed, its cell is returned to
the vacant list.
It is difficult to predict the maximum number of policies
that a sensor will need. However, as resources are limited
we assume this is likely to be in the order of 10 to 40. Our
approach is to estimate the number of policies needed for the
current application and allow for twice that number for future
adaptivity.
C. Dynamic Policy Management
Dynamic management of policies is crucial to the adaptation
ability of sensors. As discussed, management operations are
treated as regular authorization requests and are controlled
by authorization policies. Authorized management requests
result in performing an action on the ManagePoliciesActionM
component.
The ManagePoliciesActionM implements all policy man-
agement operations and provides the Action interface to the
AI. The first parameter of the action is used to indicate the
type of policy management – loading, unloading, enabling or
disabling. For loading a policy, the second parameter is a string
containing the policy text. For the other three types, the second
parameter indicates the ID of the policy to be operated. To
load a policy, the management component parses the policy
text by invoking the PolicyTextParser component. Through
the PolicyControl interface, the resultant parsed policy is
passed to the AI or the OI, and then inserted into the available
policies. The ability of enabling and disabling policies adds
flexibility to the system and reduces communication cost.
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Fig. 5. TinyOS interfaces provided for Finger.stablishment, and three-way
handshake authentication procedure.
D. Trigger and Dispatcher
We exploit the design pattern of trigger and dispatcher to
support the libraries of event sources and actions. Each event
source causes the OI to interpret an obligation policy for this
event. Following the trigger design pattern, we separate the
library of event sources from the OI. Each event source is
a TinyOS module and supports the EventSource interface to
activate a policy in the OI. The attributes of this event, such as
id and value, are passed to the OI through interface parameters.
For both the OI and the AI, a policy may result in the
invocation of an action identified in the policy. Following the
dispatcher pattern, we separate all actions from the OI and
the AI. Each action is a TinyOS module providing the Action
interface. By using the same interface, the interpreters are able
to determine the action to invoke at run time based on the
action identifier provided by the policy.
The patterns not only make the design of Finger modular,
but also extensible to facilitate easy application evolvement.
Adding event sources or actions can be simply achieved
by coding TinyOS modules supporting the interfaces of
EventSource and Action. The implementation of the OI and
the AI stays intact.
E. Authentication Manager
To overcome the heavy cost of exponential computation in
the traditional DH key agreement protocol, we exploit Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (EEC) to implement the authentication
protocol. ECC public-key cryptography has much shorter key
length and less computation overhead than RSA. We slightly
modified the TinyECC [26] package to migrate it to the body
sensor node platform.
We implemented the authentication protocol using point
multiplication in ECC. First, a base point is chosen and made
publicly known to all sensors. Next, each sensor 𝑖 generates
a random point as its secret 𝑠𝑖. The keyshare 𝑝𝑖 of sensor
𝑖 is computed by multiplying secret 𝑠𝑖 with the base point
𝐺, 𝑝𝑖 = 𝑠𝑖𝐺. To compute the pairwise shared key with of
sensor 𝑖, sensor 𝑗 multiplies its own secret with the keyshare of
sensor 𝑖, 𝐾𝑗𝑖 = 𝑠𝑗(𝑝𝑖) = 𝑠𝑗𝑠𝑖𝐺. In a similar way, sensor 𝑖 can
compute the shared key with 𝑗, 𝐾𝑖𝑗 = 𝑠𝑖(𝑝𝑗) = 𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑗𝐺 = 𝐾𝑗𝑖.
Although a point on an elliptic curve is two dimensional and
represented by (𝑥, 𝑦), only the 𝑥 value is used to generate the
shared key. The 𝑥 value is hashed to produce a 160-bit key
as the pairwise shared symmetric key.
We adopted Skipjack, implemented in TinySec [21], for
symmetric encryption with a 160 bit key length. Skipjack is a
block-cipher with the block size of 8 bytes. We use the Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC) operation mode with non-repeating
Initialisation Vector (IV). The battery level or sensor readings
can be used as the seed of a pseudo-random number generator
to generate the initial IV.
F. Exposed APIs
Finger provides simple application programming interfaces
(APIs) to application developers. The components of Finger
are packaged as a single TinyOS configuration component,
called FingerC, which hides the implementation details of
Finger from developers. Three TinyOS interfaces are exposed
as shown in Fig. 5.
The detailed definitions of the interfaces are shown in Table
IV. FingerC should be included in the application configura-
tion to use policies. The Main module of the application wires
its StdControl to that of the policy system, which initializes
the embedded components with Finger. Note that, the policy
system provides only a small set of basic event sources and
actions, such as temperature event and data report action. To
extend the functionality, application-specific event sources and
actions can be developed. Event sources should connect to the
EventSource interface to trigger obligation policies. Similarly,
all actions to be regulated by authorization policies should
connect to the Action interface.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We have conducted a series of experiments to measure
the performance of Finger in terms of memory overhead and
processing delay metrics.
A. Methodology and Setting
To facilitate performance measurements, we developed a
simple TinyOS application SimApp making use of Finger.
This application implements an event source related to ac-
celeration, and two actions which toggle the red light and
the green light, respectively. An obligation policy is deployed
for this event, which specifies that the green light be toggled
when the acceleration is larger than a threshold. It also has
an authorization policy which controls access to the red light
action.
We investigate memory overhead solely introduced by Fin-
ger. More specifically, we look at the ROM and RAM sizes.
The ROM stores the program executable and the RAM serves
as the run-time data stack. To this end, we develop a simple
application (SimApp) that makes use of Finger. SimApp is
so simple that it adds little memory overhead. Its code size
is approximately equal to the size of Finger plus the TinyOS
basics and the communication subsystem. In order to separate
the memory usage of different component and modules, we
use the script called module_memory_usage available in
TinyOS at contrib/SystemsC/scripts. This script shows the
ROM and RAM usage of every single module in an application
binary code.
The ECC and TinySec libraries require a considerable
amount of memory. In order to evaluate the core policy system,
which solely interprets and enforces obligation and autho-
rization policies, we used two versions of the policy system,
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TABLE IV
DEFINITIONS OF EXPOSED INTERFACES  
interface EventSource {
event void event_occurred (
                          event_id_t event_id 
                          context_arg_t arg ); }
interface Action {
command void perform_action (
                          uint8_t num_paras,   
                          action_para_t paras[] ); }
Finger(w) and Finger(w/o) – with and without authentication,
respectively.
We exploited the timing facility provided by TinyOS to
measure processing delays, and all measurements were di-
rectly made on the sensor running the policy system. We
developed a TinyOS module MeasureTimeM for delay mea-
surement. It employs the system interface LocalTime provided
by the TimerC hardware module to read the current local time
on the sensor. MeasureTimeM records timestamps and sends
them back to the PC for delay calculation. This guarantees that
no other delays are included in calculated processing delays.
Each of the following result is averaged over 20 independent
measurements.
All optimization switches of TinyECC were turned on for
minimization of processing latency. However, some of the
switches can be turned off to trade memory consumption for
cryptography performance. Note that a body sensor node has
only 2K bytes RAM so it cannot host Finger(w), consequently
we instead had to use a Tmote Sky node for experiments with
Finger(w). A Tmote node shares the same processor with a
body sensor, but it has a larger RAM size (10K bytes).
B. Memory Footprint
The resultant memory size of Finger is dependent on the
maximum number of policies deployed. All the following
measurements are based on a maximum number of 20
policies.
We compiled SimApp into TinyOS executable on the body
sensor node platform. Table V shows the memory usage
breakdown of SimApp, where ROM and RAM are shown
separately. The executable without authentication occupies
16.11Kbytes of ROM and 1.06Kbytes of RAM, and the one
with authentication occupies 31.77K bytes of ROM and 2.88K
bytes of RAM.
Finger occupies a total of 20.65Kbyte ROM and a total
of 2.35Kbytes RAM. To gain insight into the Finger mem-
ory usage, we show the values for several major modules
separately in Table V. It is apparent that the authentication
module, based on TinyECC, uses 15.66Kbytes of ROM and
1.82Kbytes of RAM and dominates the memory usage of
Finger. Other core modules, such as AI, OI and Parser, are
efficiently implemented and use less than 1Kbyte ROM and
0.15Kbyte RAM.
The small memory footprint demonstrates that the policy
system is feasible for the majority of available sensor plat-
forms.
C. Processing Delay
We examine various processing delays introduced by the
policy system. The experiments were conducted with 7 de-
ployed obligation policies and 8 deployed authorization poli-
cies. The delays for processing obligations and authorizations
are shown in Table VI.
The obligation interpretation delay is measured from the
time the OI is triggered by an event source to the time
the OI invokes the corresponding action. The authorization
interpretation delay is from the time when the RM passes an
incoming request to the AI to the time when the AI invokes
the associated action. The time required by the specific action
is not taken into account since different actions may incur
substantially different times. From the table we can see that
it takes as little as 62𝜇s to process an obligation policy and
81𝜇s to process an authorization policy. The latency of raising
an external event on a sensor which includes processing an
authorization policy and then an obligation policy is 140𝜇s.
We also measured the latency caused by policy management.
It takes 375𝜇s to load an authorization policy. Thus, it takes
in total 437𝜇s to process a loading-policy request and load the
policy.
We also evaluated delays for various cryptographic oper-
ations in the authentication process. With TinyECC, it takes
an average of 9530 ms to encrypt a 52-byte message, whose
content are randomly generated, and 5281ms to decrypt the
encrypted message. With the Skipjack library, it takes signifi-
cantly less time, 150𝜇s to encrypt the same message and 90𝜇s
to decrypt the encrypted message. This big difference shows
that it is essential to use shared keys for most encryption.
Based on the shared key, the authentication can be performed
more efficiently using the symmetric Skipjack cryptography.
The ECC cryptographic delays are acceptable since it is rarely
used, as our system uses the ticket technique.
D. Security Analysis
Finger enforces an array of security countermeasures, in-
cluding authentication, authorization, encryption, and time
stamping to guard against the possible attacks discussed in
Section II-C.
Based on the DH key agreement, each pair of sensors
establishes a shared key to encrypt all data transmitted over
the air between the nodes. Even if an eavesdropper can record
the complete packet transmitted between the two nodes, it is
extremely difficult for the eavesdropper to recover the original
content inside the encrypted packet.
Active attackers may try to alter data or replay a previous
session. To guarantee data integrity, a data digest is con-
catenated with the original data before the entire data are
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TABLE V
MEMORY USAGE BREAKDOWN OF SIMAPP
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TABLE VI
PROCESSING DELAYS





 sm 0359 cilbuP
Symmetric 150 µs
Decryption 
 sm 1825 cilbuP
Symmetric 90 µs
encrypted. By computing a digest of the received data and
comparing it with the received digest, a receiver is able to
determine if data has been altered. To prevent replay attacks,
a timestamp is appended to the original data before encryption.
By checking the freshness of the received packet, the receiver
can determine if the received packet has been replayed. Time
stamping depends on the availability of time synchronization,
but since a body sensor network is of relatively small scale,
it is not difficult to synchronize the clocks of the sensors in
the network.
Finger employs authentication to prevent impersonation at-
tacks. A subject sensor or dynamic node must be authenticated
and authorized to invoke an operation on the target sensor. An
impersonating sensor would not have the private key share of
the sensor that it is trying to impersonate, so would not be
authenticated.
Authorization policies specify fine-grained access control to
protect target sensors, for example, from careless operations.
E. Ease of Use Analysis
For the policy system, it is difficult to quantitatively evaluate
the degree of ease of use. There are three factors pertaining
to ease of use First, the policy language described in this
paper is a declarative language as is DSN [12], although
Finger is much simpler. DSN has demonstrated the use of
a declarative language can considerably reduce the number of
lines of program code required to program a variety of sensor
protocols. Finger shares similar advantages in that by using
declarative policies the program logic can be simplified and
hence the program length can be reduced. We contend that
our policy language has very few constructs so it is easier to
master than other declarative languages.
Second, DSN is a purely declarative system, with which
a developer is expected to program most aspects of a sen-
sor network. As pointed out in [12], this is inflexibile for
implementing low-level device and data manipulation, so
access to conventional imperiative laguage such as nesC is
still required. Finger facilitates combining declarative policies
defining the adaptive strategy with low-level control actions
are programmed in the conventional language such as nesC.
Finally, user requirements may change over time and the
working environment may also change. This means that it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to hard-code all decisions be-
forehand. Instead, one needs a way to change the behavior of a
sensor in order to adapt to the changes of user requirements or
the current context. The policy system enables such adaptation
or reconfiguration by dynamically adding/removing policies or
enabling/disabling existing policies, without re-programming
the entire sensor network or shutting it down. With DSN, a
complete program must be installed on a node so adaptation
requires re-installation.
VI. DISCUSSION
Currently, Finger supports a condition referring to a single
context variable for both obligation and authorization policies.
Realistic applications may need conditions on multiple context
variables. A full constraint is formed by connecting several
clauses using logical operators. Finger can be extended to sup-
port setting a condition on multiple variables. This complicates
the design of Finger and requires additional space to store the
condition. Moreover, additional latency will be introduced for
condition evaluation.
The maximum number of policies is limited by the data
memory size. If only a small number of policies can be
accommodated, a sensor will have limited adaptability and
self-configuration abilities. This can be mitigated by exploiting
the external flash memory which can be up to 2M bytes
on new sensors [5]. Although, external flash memory can
accommodate a large number of policies, there are several
issues with using flash memory. First, accessing flash memory
consumes considerable energy. Second, flash memory does not
support random access and must be read and written in blocks.
This could make it impractical for storing current policies but
alternative sets of policies could be stored in flash and swapped
with current policies for predefined adaptation.
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Limitations of Finger. Note that the policy language
provided in Finger is not a general purpose programming
language. Loading, unloading, enabling and disabling policies
on a sensor cannot be used to change the behaviours of
the node at arbitrary granularity. Instead, constrained changes
of the sensor’s behaviour can be performed in terms of
existing events and actions, or changing authorization rules
with respect to a subject. In the current implementation, Finger
does not support the dynamic addition or removal of actions
and events due to the TinyOS limitation of not supporting
dynamic code modification. This results in some limitations
on the adaptive capability. However, it is possible to compose
new actions which are a combination of existing implemented
actions.
VII. RELATED WORK
Finger is motivated by many successful policy systems for
traditional distributed systems. Policy-based management of
networks and distributed systems [10], [35] has received sig-
nificant attention. It has been applied to security management
and privacy preservation [20]. Considerable effort has been
applied to develop expressive languages for specifying policies
[9], [13], [19], [29]. Nevertheless, these languages are not
suitable for sensor networks due to resource constraints. For
example, SecPAL [9] developed at Microsoft Research is a
language for expressing decentralized authorization policies
for large-scale computing environments. The policy language
developed for Finger is a very simplified version of Ponder2.
The idea of policies for sensor network management has been
investigated in [10], which uses policies to enable end users
to detect and handle events, and therefore configure the sensor
network. However, the polices are not processed at the sensor
level, but follows the traditional policy-driven approach.
Network reprogramming [18], [23] has been used to realize
sensor network adaptation to application requirements. Basi-
cally, the image of the new application executable has to be
conveyed to every sensor in the network. The image file is
temporarily stored on external Flash memory. After a sensor
has received the complete image, it restarts itself and reads the
new application binary from the Flash to the main memory.
Deluge [18] has techniques to control communication over-
head and to reduce reprogramming latency. However, network
reprogramming still incurs very high energy overhead due
to the large volume of data communication. In addition, the
current operation of the network will inevitably be interrupted.
This is unacceptable for mission-critical applications.
Programming sensor networks is notoriously difficult. Thus,
a large body of work explores high level programming models.
TinyDB [31] considers the main task of a sensor is to request
relevant data and provides a declarative, SQL-like query
language. DSN is a declarative platform for sensor networks
[12] which focuses on both data acquisition and network pro-
tocol processing. It consists of a declarative language Snlog,
compiler and runtime implementation, based on Datalog [7].
With DSN, programming efficiency is improved compared
with programming in nesC.
Mate [24] is another technology for reconfiguring a sensor
network and reduces the communication cost of completely
reprogramming the sensor network. Every sensor is running a
virtual machine. Applications can be developed using a simple
high-level language. Such applications can be run by a sensor
through the virtual machine interpreting the program script.
Finger adopts a policy-based approach rather than using a
full declarative language or scripts. Policies provide a much
more constrained form of ‘programming’ the adaptability and
reconfiguration required for sensor networks. When changing
behaviours of a sensor in order to adapt to various changes,
one can simply change the set of policies in the sensors,
without changing the entire program or script. Low-level
control actions can still be implemented using the traditional
nesC language. The developers can leverage on the advantage
of policy driven management by easily including the Finger
component in their application programs. Furthermore, poli-
cies can be transformed into logic formalism for analysis to
detect conflicts [29], which is not practical for general script
languages. In addition, security of the network has also been
considered by enforcement of authorization policies, which
is not taken into account by network programming or virtual
machines.
Cryptography provides the foundation for sensor networks
to achieve security goals. Many symmetric cryptography
schemes [21] have been studied since they are affordable for
such resource-constrained platforms as sensors. Data confi-
dentiality in sensor networks using symmetric cryptography
cannot be achieved without key management [14], [17], [28].
However, existing key management schemes cannot fulfil
the fine-grained access control requirement in BSNs where
an efficient authentication protocol is required as well as
specification and implementation of authorization.
It is important to enforce secure operations in wireless
sensor networks. Cryptography is necessary so key manage-
ment is a central issue. There has been considerable work
on managing secret keys in sensor networks. Chan et al. [11]
proposed a method for identifying and excluding compromised
sensor nodes.
Public-key cryptography provides an attractive infrastruc-
ture for network security. However, public-key cryptography is
too costly for implementation on resource-constrained sensors.
Nevertheless, some studies [26], [32] have shown that it is
viable to implement elliptic curve based public key cryptog-
raphy on sensors, e.g. the TinyECC [26] configurable library.
It allows tradeoffs between resource usage and performance
– cryptographic performance can be enhanced by using more
memory if available.
Little work has explored the realization of policy-driven
management for resource-constrained sensor networks. The
Self-Managed Cell (SMC) [22] is an early attempt to intro-
duce a policy-based approach for managing wireless sensors.
However, it uses the full Ponder2 which requires a Java
runtime environment that cannot be accommodated on an
extremely resource-constrained sensor. To the best of our
knowledge, Finger is the first functional policy system running
on sensors, which supports fine-grained policy interpretation
and enforcement.
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VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented a novel policy system called Finger
for BSNs. Finger supports efficient on-node interpretation and
enforcement of both obligation and authorization policies. It
realizes policy-based dynamic adaptation to context changes
or changes in application requirements without interrupting the
current network operation. Fine-grained access control is also
enabled such that sensitive data or operations can be protected
against unauthorized access. Performance measurements of
Finger indicate that it is viable and practical for resource-
constrained BSNs. With Finger, application development can
also be accelerated since developers only need to focus on
developing event sources and actions, and composing policies.
Although Finger has been implemented on the body sensor
node platform, it is extensible and can be deployed to many
other platforms including Mica2, Telos and TMote Sky.
Future work will extend the current condition model to
support more flexible condition constraints and provide an
easier to use platform for generating finger policies. It is also
necessary to deploy conflict detection and compliance mech-
anisms [8]. The simplicity of sensor node policies suggests
that such techniques can be developed without much difficulty
although the emphasis will be on detecting conflicts before
loading policies onto nodes.
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